Eiropas Savienība un Krievija

Pieaug domstarpības starp Eiropas Savienību un Krieviju enerģijas drošības jautājumos

EIROPĀ. 2006. gada 26. maijs, EKL. Ceturtdien un piektdien notikušā Eiropas Savienības un Krievijas Federācijas sanāksmē galvenās sarunas notika par enerģijas drošības jautājumiem, tomēr vienošanās netika panākta. Pirms sanāksmes Eiropas Savienība atkārtoti aicināja Krieviju ratificēt 1994. gada Līgumu par Enerģijas Hartu un pievienoto Tranzīta protokolu, kas pārtrauktu Gazprom gāzes cauruļvadu monopolu.

Valsts kontrolētais Krievijas gāzes monopolists Gazprom piegādā 25% Eiropas Savienības patērētās gāzes, tomēr virkne Eiropas Savienības Dalībvalstu, piemēram, Francija un Somija, spēj samazināt savu enerģētisko atkarību, pievēršoties plašākai kodol- un bio enerģijas izmantošanai, kā arī samazinot gāzes un naftas patēriņu. Zviedrija strādā, lai līdz 2020. gadam tā kļūtu par no naftas brīvu valsti.

Sanāksmes laikā Melnās jūras kūrortpilsētā Sočos Krievijas prezidents Vladimirs Putins nosauca valsts oligarhu kontrolētos naftas un gāzes monopolus " par (Krievijas) ekonomikas svētāko vietu". Gazprom, naftas cauruļvadu monopolists Transņeftj un Rosņeftj (2005. gadā pārņēma lielāko Krievijas privāto naftas uzņēmumu Jukos) īsteno valsts politiku (tai skaitā politisku šantāžu) ar korporatīviem līdzekļiem.  Arī Krievijas vadošais elektroenerģijas uzņēmums - Vienotās EnergoSistēmas - ir valsts īpašumā esošs nacionāls monopolists, kas arī vēlas paplašināt savu ietekmi.

Eiropas Savienība un Krievija paraksta līgumus par vīzu režīma atvieglojumiem un personu atpakaļuzņemšanu

EIROPĀ. 2006. gada 25. maijs, EKL. Eiropas Savienības (ES) un Krievijas Federācijas (KF) sanāksmes laikā tika parakstīti līgumi par vīzu procedūras atvieglojumiem un personu atpakaļuzņemšanu. Maksa par vīzu pieteikumu izskatīšanu ir noteikta 35 eiru (aptuveni 25 latu) apmērā, bet, piemēram, studenti varēs saņemt vīzas bez maksas. Lai līgumi stātos spēkā, tos jāapstiprina ES Ministru padomei un KF Valsts domei. Avots: Ārlietu ministrija.

Latvija pozitīvi vērtē abu līgumu noslēgšanu. Līgums par vīzu procedūras atvieglojumiem veicinās personu kustību, uzņēmējdarbības, izglītības, kultūras u.c. kontaktus.

Daudzi inflāciju ietekmējoši faktori nav saistīti ar Latvijas iestāšanos ES. Tās ir naftas cenu svārstības pasaules tirgū. Tas ir Krievijas lēmums paaugstināt gāzes piegādes cenas Latvijai un vairākām citām valstīm, līdz ar ko neizbēgami pieaug arī gāzes un apkures tarifi. Par plāniem paaugstināt elektrības tarifus ir paziņojis arī Latvenergo. Energoresursu sadārdzinājums ne tikai atspoguļojas gāzes un apkures rēķinos, kurus maksā iedzīvotāji, bet arī paaugstina daudzu preču un pakalpojumu pašizmaksu un cenu.

Brisele, 2.maijs, LETA--REUTERS. Eiropas Savienība (ES) gatavojas Krievijas dabasgāzes koncernam "Gazprom" piemērot tādus pašus konkurenci regulējošus noteikumus kā jebkurai citai Eiropas kompānijai, teikts otrdien izplatītajā ES paziņojumā.

Briselē publiskotājā vēstulē Krievijas enerģētikas ministram Viktoram Kristenko ES Enerģētikas komisārs Andris Piebalgs un Austrijas ekonomikas ministrs Martins Bartenšteins ES prezidentūras vārdā norāda, ka konkurenci regulējošie noteikumi, kas attiecināmi uz kompāniju "Gazprom" nebūs citādi, kā tie, kas arī citām kompānijām tiek piemēroti ES konkurences likumu ietvaros un tie tiks piemēroti tieši tādā pašā veidā.

Gazprom un Kremlis nevēlas vienotas ES Krievijas politikas izveidi - Gazprom vēlas palielināt ietekmi (monopolu) gāzes sadales un pārdošanas biznesā ES teritorijā

KAIMIŅOS. Krievijas gāzes monopolista "Gazprom" prezidents Aleksejs Millers tikšanās laikā Maskavā, ceturtdien, 20. aprīlī, divdesmit piecu ES valstu vēstniekiem pavēstīja - ja Eiropas valstis liegs Gazprom iegūt lielāku ietekmi gāzes sadales un pārdošanas biznesā savā teritorijā, Krievija nākotnē attīstīs gāzes piegādi Ķīnai un Ziemeļamerikai uz Eiropas rēķina.

Šāds solis iezīmē dramatiskas pārmaiņas ES-Krievijas attiecībās - gāzes piegādes var tikt izmantotas kā politiskās šantāžas līdzeklis pret jebkuru Gazprom klientu. Būtībā Gazprom ir kļuvis par valsts uzņēmumu, kas īsteno valsts politiku (tai skaitā politisku šantāžu) ar korporatīviem līdzekļiem. Līdzīgu politiku īsteno divi citi valsts kontrolē nonākuši uzņēmumi Transņeftj (naftas cauruļvadu monopolists) un Rosņeftj (2005. gadā pārņēma lielāko Krievijas privāto naftas uzņēmumu Jukos). Arī Krievijas vadošais elektroenerģijas uzņēmums - Vienotās EnergoSistēmas - ir valsts īpašumā esošs nacionālais monopolists, kas arī vēlas paplašināt savu ietekmi.

Tikmēr Zviedrijas valdība 2006. gada februārī paziņoja, ka Zviedrijai līdz 2020. gadam jākļūst par no-naftas-brīvu valsti (Naftas neatkarības komisija tika izveidota 2005. gada nogalē http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2058/a/57732 ). Pēdējos divdesmit gados tā jau ir samazinājusi naftas lietošanu mājokļu apsildīšanā par 70% (šobrīd apmēram 35% Zviedrijā patērētās enerģijas top, izmantojot naftu). Līdzīgu mērķi sev ir izvirzījusi arī Īslande.

Francija un Somija savu enerģētisko neatkarību nodrošina ar kodolenerģijas palīdzību (biezi apdzīvotajā Francijā strādā 58 kodolreaktori, kas ražo 78% valstī patērētās elektroenerģijas, līdz 2020. gadam Francijā  tiks pabeigts darbs pie ceturtās paaudzes kodolreaktora būves; līdzīga attīstība notiek vēl biezāk apdzīvotajā Japānā, savu piekto atomstaciju (līdz 2009. gadam) būvē arī Somija). Dānija ir pasaulē vadošajās pozīcijās vēja un bio enerģijas izmantošanā (25% patēriņa). Pārmaiņu ātrumu un polītisko lēmumu pieņemšanu paātrinās naftas cenu un pieprasījuma kāpums.

Avoti: REUTERS www.reuters.com  STRATFOR www.stratfor.com LETA www.leta.lv

Eiropa: pretošanās asimilācijai (Stratfor analīze)

Summary

Russian state energy firm Gazprom has bluntly informed European states that if they do not allow it to directly own distribution and retail natural gas infrastructure and thus penetrate deeply into their economies, they will face retaliation that could include a diversion of Gazprom's attention -- and natural gas -- to other markets. It is not a threat that Gazprom can deliver on, either now or in the future, but it marks a critical evolution both in internal Russian politics and European-Russian relations.

Analysis

Gazprom met with ambassadors from all 25 EU states in Moscow on April 20 to discuss natural gas supplies. From the European point of view the meeting diverted heavily from expectations and heralds a dramatic change in intra-Russian, not to mention Russian-European, relations.

The European ambassadors went into the meeting under the impression that they were going to use their collective weight to pressure Gazprom into behaving more responsibly (in their minds) as an energy provider. They saw Gazprom's decision to slash natural gas exports to Ukraine, an action that actually resulted in cutoffs not to delinquent Ukrainians but to paid-up Europeans, as the height of irresponsibility. Additional cutoffs to Europe due to a spell of excessively cold Russian winter weather (which is saying something) reeked, in Europe's opinion, of poor planning and management on the part of Gazprom. The ambassadors were ready to give the company a stern talking-to. And they figured that they would have a receptive audience in Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller. Unlike many Russians who feel that energy is a political lever or even weapon, Miller traditionally is concerned about things such as customer relations and profitability.

The ambassadors could not have been more surprised with how the meeting progressed -- or how Miller had changed. The calm, sophisticated but firm lecture that they expected to give was instead delivered to them. Miller flatly informed the Europeans that they should stop interfering with Gazprom's efforts to acquire downstream assets within the European Union.

Gazprom already controls all meaningful natural gas production facilities, transport pipelines and distribution infrastructure within Russia. It now wants to branch out and extend its corporate empire to cover transport and distribution infrastructure wherever it can. Gazprom wants to evolve from simply a raw material producer to a vertically integrated continent-spanning energy monopoly. And, as Miller informed the Europeans, should they not become more receptive to Gazprom's desires, then his firm just might take its business -- and its natural gas -- elsewhere.

The Europeans have been less than forthcoming in this process. Most European countries -- particularly in Western Europe -- jealously control their energy networks and are allergically hostile even to fellow European countries whose firms desire to expand their domain. But even states with relatively liberalized energy networks are hostile to the idea of Russian domination; there are simply too many political strings attached where the Kremlin is involved. And that is even without the added complication of a trust-style domination of one company controlling everything from the wellhead to the stove -- something that free-market-minded EU states oppose in its own right.

Gazprom does not much care for such details, and feels by dint of its size (it is the world's largest natural gas firm), its importance (it supplies more than 40 percent of EU natural gas imports) and its political connections (it is majority government-owned) that the Europeans had better recognize reality for what it is and let Gazprom in.

Such a message is a major departure not only from the old Gazprom, but also from Kremlin policy.

Russian nationalists have long argued that not exploiting Gazprom's market share would buy them political leverage in the countries to Russia's west. Thus Gazprom sold natural gas to Western and Central Europe, and former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Moldova, relatively cheaply. The logic did not hold. Most Europeans -- particularly Central Europeans who until recently were Soviet satellites -- distrust Russia regardless of what Gazprom charges for its energy exports. This fact finally hit home in Russia in just the past two years as a new sort of realism sunk in, and as a consequence European prices doubled and Ukrainian prices tripled. What must be particularly frightening to the Europeans is that Miller's pragmatism and rationality now appear to be married to the Russian nationalists' hostility. They now face high prices and political strings and demands for surrendering critical assets all in one package, from one of the few Russians whom they thought saw things their way.

Moving forward, there are two critical things the Europeans will be worrying about.

First, the driving force behind Russian energy firms is rapidly evolving. Russian press reports aside, no one has ever seriously believed that Russian energy politics were not … well, political in some way. But there is a difference between a company with state links mixing national interests in with its corporate outlook, and a state firm making state policy with corporate tools. Until recently Gazprom was a state-run but not state majority-owned natural gas firm. Now it is a state-owned natural gas and oil firm looking to consolidate control over oil and natural gas at home while establishing a global empire. Big difference.

Second, Gazprom is not the only petroleum piranha in the European goldfish pond. Two other state-owned firms -- Rosneft and Transneft -- are in the mix as well. Rosneft in 2005 took over most of Yukos, formerly Russia's largest private oil firm, while Transneft controls the bulk of Russia's oil transport network. Both undeniably and proudly look out for Russia's national interest, and just like Gazprom, are aggressively expanding their control over Russia's oil resources while casting their gaze abroad. Europe's problem is not limited to Gazprom and natural gas specifically, but to Russia and energy in general. Bear in mind that Russia's dominant electricity firm, Unified Energy Systems, is not only also majority state-owned and also a national monopoly, but it is also a chief exporter of power to Europe and also seeking to expand its own empire.

There is, however, one quite bright spot to keep in mind if you are a European. Although Miller warned that Gazprom would shift its efforts to supplying North America and East Asia should the Europeans not prove more cooperative, it will do no such thing.

First, and most obviously, it is an issue of infrastructure. Multithousand-mile-long pipeline networks built at the cost of hundreds of billions of dollars over the course of 50 years to tie together an empire and a continent cannot simply be picked up and relocated. It would take another 50 years and hundreds of billions to construct alternatives. Russian natural gas is not going anywhere but Europe any time soon. Gazprom -- in fact, all Russian state energy firms -- are technologically obsolete, and because of stiff government tax policies, capital shy. As the dozens of largely fallow pipeline projects they have postulated show, even when these firms come up with a plan to diversify, shift or even entangle customers, they generally lack the means to implement them. What is in danger from Europe's point of view is not the volume that Russia currently ships westward, but the strategic direction of any future, additional exports.

Second, geographic and geopolitical constraints make North America and East Asia daunting alternative markets. North America is (obviously) on the wrong side of the planet, ruling pipeline connections out completely. Gazprom's only experience with liquefied natural gas (LNG) -- the only other way to ship the stuff -- it got from effectively blackmailing Royal Dutch/Shell at its Sakhalin-2 venture, and that facility will not even be up and running for another year at least. And even if Russia could ship LNG in vast volumes, does anyone really think that Washington would be more welcoming to Russian state ownership of U.S. infrastructure than Paris is to Russian state ownership of French infrastructure?

Shipping to East Asia has other complications. On one hand, Russia currently has no natural gas or oil energy infrastructure linking itself to Japan, China or the Korean Peninsula. In fact, Siberian infrastructure of any kind is thin, consisting of but two rail lines and one road -- and one of those rail lines and that road only became operational within the past five years.

On the other hand, the Russians are quietly terrified of China. Russia took roughly 1 million square miles of territory away from China in the 1800s, something that Beijing certainly has not forgotten; in fact, aside from Taiwan, the most significant piece of China's once far-flung empire still outside of Beijing's control is inside Russia. China has unofficially been encouraging Chinese migration north into Siberia even as Siberian Russians have been moving back to European Russia. Constructing the massive natural gas infrastructure that would be necessary to link China to Russia also would involve parallel road-and-rail connections that, in essence, could be used as an invasion corridor. Put more simply, there are excellent reasons why Russian-Chinese energy cooperation is enthusiastic and robust -- on paper.

Which puts Europe in the awkward position of knowing that Gazprom et al is aggressive, unsatisfied and likely to remain so -- a combination that countries on Russia's periphery know from experience rarely ends well. The only solution -- and it is a lousy one -- is to find some way to cut natural gas consumption or find new sources to the tune of 140 billion cubic meters per year.

As the spokesman for Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, the unlucky European who has the job of taking point on addressing the energy dependency issue, said April 20 of Miller's threat, "That statement gives grounds to our concerns on the growing foreign dependency of European energy supply and ... our need to diversify both the origin of our supplies and our supply routes."

EurActiv, 26. maijs, 2006. Brisele.

While Russia's President Putin was busy trying to reduce European worries over his country's reliability as an energy supplier, the Russian minister for natural resources has threatened to take more state control of three important foreign energy investment projects.

The Russian National Resources Minister announced on 25 May that he would like to review the production sharing agreements with Western energy companies over the Sakhalin-1 and -2 projects. These investment projects for oil and gas extraction in Eastern Russia are led by Exxon Mobil, Shell and Total.